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SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC. v. MEMBERS OF THE
NEW YORK STATE CRIME VICTIMS BOARD:
HOW THE CHARACTERIZATION OF A SPEECH
REGULATION CAN EFFECTIVELY DESTROY A
LEGITIMATE LAW
The age-old expression that crime does not pay has lost most of its validity
in today's society.' In an effort to make crime less profitable,2 Congress3
and forty-three states4 have passed legislation to prevent criminals from en-
1. See generally Dennis Duggan, How Sleazy Can This Story Get?, NEWSDAY, June 9,
1992, at 7 (describing an attempt to sell teen-age accused murderer Amy Fisher's story to raise
$2,000,000 in bail money); John Leo, The Wages of Sin, TIME, Mar. 23, 1987, at 77 (describing
receipt of $250,000 for book and television rights to the story of Sydney Biddle Barrows', the
"Mayflower Madam"); Bill Nichols, What the Hell's a Guy Gonna Do?, USA TODAY, Jan. 9,
1987, at IA, 2A (detailing the receipt of $50,000 by convicted murderer Roswell Gilbert's for
rights to the story of his mercy killing).
2. The Son of Sam law and other criminal antiprofit laws are intended to "ensure that
monies received by the criminal under such circumstances shall first be made available to
recompensate the victims of that crime for their loss and suffering." Simon & Schuster v.
Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 782 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
3. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3681-82 (West Supp. 1992). The fed-
eral statute provides in pertinent part:
Order of Special Forfeiture
(a) ... the court shall ... order such defendant to forfeit all or any part of pro-
ceeds received or to be received by that defendant ... from a contract relating to a
depiction of such crime in a movie, book, newspaper, magazine, radio or television
production, or live entertainment of any kind, or an expression of that defendant's
thoughts, opinions, or emotions regarding such crime.
Id. § 3681; see also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 10601-607 (West Supp. 1992) (establishing a fund for vic-
tims into which specified convicted criminals must pay the proceeds from their crimes).
4. See ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to -84 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4201 to -4202 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308 (Michie 1987);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-201 to -207 (1988 &
Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 9101-06 (1987 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-30 to -32 (Michie 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 351-81 to -88 (Supp.
1988); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 411 (Smith-Hurd 1989 &
Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-3.7-1 to 7-6 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15
(West Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319 to -7321 (Supp. 1991); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 346.165 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1831 to -1839
(West 1982 & Supp. 1991); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (1957 & Supp. 1992); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 258A, § 8 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West
Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 IA.68 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 99-38-1 to -11 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 53-9-104(1)(d) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1836 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT.
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joying the proceeds of their crimes by allowing victims to recover civil dam-
ages from any profits the criminal has generated through the exploitation of
the crime. A principal example of this type of legislation is New York's Son
of Sam law.5
The 1977 Son of Sam law required that an entity contracting for the rights
to the story of a person accused or convicted of a crime surrender all pro-
ceeds from that contract to the New York State Crime Victims Board.6 The
law required the Board to deposit the money in an escrow account from
which the victim could recover his or her civil judgment against the crimi-
nal.7 The purpose of the Son of Sam law was to help ensure that criminals
did not profit at their victims' expense,8 not to prevent the telling of the
ANN. § 217.265 (Michie 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-26 to -33 (West 1986 & Supp.
1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Michie 1990); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney
1982 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01 to -.06 (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 17 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18
(Purdon 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-1 to -12 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40
to -80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-1 (1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-201 to -208 (1980 & Supp. 1992); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-
1 §§ 16 to -18 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5 (1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.2-368.19 to .22 (Michie 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.200 to -.280 (1992);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 1-40-112(d)-(g) (1988).
5. Son of Sam Law, 1977 N.Y. LAWS 823 (codified as amended at N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991)) [hereinafter Son of Sam law]. In response to the
potential fortune that David Berkowitz stood to amass as a result of selling his account of the
five brutal murders he committed in the summer of 1977, the New York legislature passed a
statute to redirect the profits to the victims and their families. 1977 New York State Legisla-
tive Annual 267, Assembly Bill Memorandum, Senator Emmanuel R. Gold. Section 632-a
provided that any person or legal entity that contracts with one who has been "accused or
convicted of a crime" for the production of a book or other expression amounting to a "reen-
actment of such crime" or expression of the "accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings,
opinions or emotions regarding such crime" had to pay over to a state agency "any moneys
which would otherwise, by terms of such contract, be owing to the [wrongdoer]," to be depos-
ited in an escrow account. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632(a)(1). In turn, the agency used the money
to satisfy judgments awarded to victims of the crime, who had five years in which to file suit.
Id. § 632(a)(2). Any funds remaining in the escrow account after the five year period were
payable to the convict/accused. Id. § 632(a)(4).
6. Id. § 632(a)(1).
7. Id. The statute required the Board to publicize the availability of the escrow funds in
newspapers and other publications of general circulation. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2). The
distribution of funds from the account was prioritized to ensure that victims were paid before
the criminal and other judgment creditors. Id. § 632-a(l 1). The statute prevented the expira-
tion of the victim's claim under the regular statute of limitations for a tort or wrongful death
action by creating a new in rem cause of action with its own five year statute of limitations
(commencing when the escrow account was established). Id. § 632-a(7). After expiration of
the five year period, the criminal was entitled to receive the balance of the escrow account. Id.
at § 632-a(4). The statute also prohibited criminals from transferring their legal interest in the
profits to other entities. Id. § 632-a(9).
8. See Assembly Bill Memorandum, supra note 5.
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criminals' stories.9 The Son of Sam law attempted to redress the unfairness
of criminals profiting from their crime story before their victims are compen-
sated for any damages sustained.10
When the Son of Sam law was challenged, the law with regard to First
Amendment issues was relatively clear. Government"' actions can abridge
speech in two ways. First, government regulations can aim at ideas or infor-
mation, either by targeting the specific message or viewpoint such actions
express or by monitoring the effects produced by the dissemination of the
information or ideas. 2 Examples include government discharge of public
9. Id. The memorandum of the bill's sponsor, Senator Emmanuel R. Gold, stated:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an individual, such as the
forty-four caliber killer, can expect to receive large sums of money for his story once
he is captured-while five people are dead, other people were injured as a result of
his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all criminal situations, the victim
must be more important than the criminal.
Id. The statute was designed to simply provide a means for a victim to be compensated directly
from the criminal who caused the harm. The Son of Sam law does not prohibit a criminal
from speaking about his crime nor does it preclude a publisher from printing any work in
conjunction with an accused or convicted offender. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a.
New York's Governor Mario M. Cuomo reiterated the purpose of the original Son of Sam
law in a March 23, 1992 press release announcing the "revised" Son of Sam law. March 23,
1992 Press Release, State of New York Executive Chamber, Mario M. Cuomo, Governor.
Governor Cuomo stated, "No law can fully restore an individual's peace of mind once it has
been shattered by crime, but this legislation can ease the victim's burden by providing a mech-
anism for restitution and reparation, and preventing criminals from profiting from their
crimes." Id.
10. The procedures in the statute were designed to address the special problems a victim
of a highly publicized crime encounters. Most crime victims do not sue criminals for their
injuries and suffering because the criminal usually does not have any significant assets from
which a civil judgment may be satisfied. Even "[i]f the defendant does have money or property
at the time of the offense, it is quickly exhausted on bail and/or legal expenses." LeRoy G.
Schultz, The Violated: A Proposal to Compensate Victims of Violent Crime, 10 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 238, 243 (1965); see also LeRoy L. Lamborn, The Propriety of Governmental Compensa-
tion of Victims of Crime, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 446, 451 n.20 (1973). "Only 15 percent of
the victims even consider suing; five percent consult a lawyer; slightly fewer actually try to
collect, and only two percent collect anything." Id. (citing ALLEN M. LINDEN, THE REPORT
OF THE OSGOODE HALL STUDY OF COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 21 (1968)).
The primary problem under the current system is that victims are usually unable to recover
anything from the criminal because any profit the criminal may receive from discussing his or
her crime may not be acquired until several years after the actual commission of the crime. As
a result of this time lag, the tort and wrongful death action statutes will have most likely run.
See Joel Rothman, Comment, In Cold Type: Statutory Approaches to the Problem of the Of-
fender as Author, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 267 (1980).
11. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
12. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789 (2d ed.
1988).
Catholic University Law Review
employees found in possession of subversive literature13 and government
punishment of publications critical of the state. '"
Second, without aiming at ideas or information directly, the government
can constrict the flow of information and ideas while pursuing other goals,
either by limiting an activity through which information and ideas might be
conveyed or by enforcing rules that might discourage the communication of
ideas and information.' 5 Illustrative cases include government restrictions
against loudspeakers in residential areas, 16 government demands for testi-
mony before a grand jury despite the desire of informants to remain anony-
mous,1 7 and ceilings on campaign contributions.'"
The United States Supreme Court has developed two general approaches
to the resolution of First Amendment claims.' If a government regulation
is aimed at the communicative impact of an act, the regulation is unconstitu-
tional unless the government can show that there is a compelling state inter-
est that outweighs the restriction on speech and that the regulation is
narrowly tailored to achieve this objective.20 Because the content-based reg-
13. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (invalidating stat-
ute barring teachers from employment in schools solely on the basis of membership in "subver-
sive" organizations).
14. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963) (invalidating statutes aimed only at subject matter that was con-
sidered offensive or consisting of unpopular viewpoints).
15. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-2 at 790.
16. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding restrictions on
loudspeakers).
17. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (upholding government demands
that reporters testify before a grand jury).
18. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding ceilings on campaign
contributions).
19. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-2 at 789-91. The court must first determine whether the
effect of section 632-a is to restrict expressive activity or whether its effect is merely to regulate
the proceeds of that expressive activity. Simon & Schuster v. Members of New York State
Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). Once this determination is made, the court must then apply the
appropriate standard of review, either strict scrutiny or a lesser standard. Id.; see also Konigs-
berg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961) (recognizing that government may abridge
speech in distinct ways requiring distinct judicial methods); infra notes 116-32 and accompa-
nying text (illustrating the Court's use of a "limited categorical analysis" for certain types of
expression).
20. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-8 at 833. The Court requires an especially close nexus
between the ends, the legislative objective of the law, and the means, the vehicle it implements
to achieve that objective. The statute must be narrowly aimed at permissible and significant
government objectives so as not to restrict more expressive conduct than absolutely necessary.
The Court holds content-based regulations constitutional only if they are a narrowly drawn
means of serving compelling state interests. Id. State interests must meet two criteria to re-
ceive "compelling" status. First, the state must have a strong interest in realizing the statute's
underlying policies. Id. Second, the magnitude of the state interests achieved must outweigh
the restriction's chilling effect on speech. Id. A statute fails the constitutional test of narrowly
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ulations carry this presumption of unconstitutionality, the level of scrutiny is
extremely high and difficult to meet. If a government regulation is aimed at
the noncommunicative impact of an act, the regulation is considered consti-
tutional so long as it does not unduly constrict the flow of information and
ideas.2 ' This "balance" between the value of freedom of expression and the
government's regulatory interests is struck on a case-by-case basis.22
The Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New
York State Crime Victims Board,2 3 struck down New York's Son of Sam law
24as violative of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Court's characterization of this law as a content-based speech regula-
tion25 could possibly invalidate all criminal anti-profit statutes and thus un-
dermine the compelling government interest of compensating victims of
crime and ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes.2 6
In April 1980, police arrested Henry Hill and charged him with six counts
of conspiracy to sell narcotics. 27 In exchange for immunity from prosecu-
tion, Hill cooperated with the government and entered the Federal Witness
Protection Program.28 In 1981, Simon & Schuster, Inc. contracted with Hill
to publish a non-fiction work based on his life of organized crime in New
tailored means if an alternative structure would achieve the state interests with less of a deter-
rent effect on speech.
21. Id. § 12-2 at 792.
22. Id. The Court, in essence, strikes a balance between the value of the freedom of ex-
pression being infringed and the government's regulatory interests. This balance "is struck on
a case-by-case basis, guided by whatever unifying principles may be articulated." Id.; see also
Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962) (discussing
First Amendment balancing).
23. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
24. Id. at 512.
25. Id. at 508. The Supreme Court classifies laws that regulate speech as content-based if
they restrict public discussion of an entire topic. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (invalidating a prohibition against the inclusion by public
utility companies in monthly bills of inserts that discussed controversial issues of public policy
as a content-based regulation). But see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
47-48 (1986) (narrowing the test for content-based regulations to one where regulations have
the "predominent intent" and not the "secondary effects" of regulating speech on the basis of
content).
26. Simon and Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 504.
27. Id. Henry Hill admitted to a life of crime spanning over 25 years. His most notorious
crimes included the theft of six million dollars from Lufthansa Airlines in 1978 and the 1978-
79 Boston College point-shaving scandal. Id.
28. Id. The Federal Witness Protection Program is designed to protect witnesses who
testify for the government by issuing new identities and relocating witnesses. See ORGANIZED
CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970, §§ 501-504, 18 U.S.C. note preceeding § 3481 (1982). See
generally, Karen W. Kiley et al., Constitutional Law-The Witness Protection Program: Inves-
tigating the Right to Companionship, Due Process, and Preemption, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
431 (1984) (analyzing the witness protection program's effect on divorced parents).
1993]
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York City.29 Learning of the agreement, the New York State Crime Victims
Board concluded that the contract was subject to the Son of Sam law be-
cause the book contained Hill's thoughts, feelings and opinions about his
involvement in criminal activity.3° The Crime Victims Board ordered Simon
& Schuster to turn over all monies owed to Hill to be held in escrow for the
victims of Hill's crimes.31 Subsequently, Simon & Schuster filed suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. Simon & Schuster contended that the Son of Sam law
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.32 The district court held
that the Son of Sam law did not violate the First Amendment because the
law was directed at regulating the proceeds of the contract, a nonspeech
element.33
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the
statute under a strict scrutiny standard of review and affirmed the district
court's decision. 34 The court of appeals determined that the Son of Sam law
imposed a direct burden on free expression and therefore constituted a con-
tent-based restriction on speech.35 The court concluded, however, that the
29. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 504. On September 1, 1981, Simon & Schuster, Hill
and Nicholas Pileggi entered into a standard publishing agreement by which Hill and Pileggi
sold exclusive publishing rights to Hill's story. Brief for Respondent n. 17, Simon & Schuster,
Inc., v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) [here-
inafter Respondent's Brief]. Notably, at the time the Board discovered the existence of the
contract, Simon & Schuster had already paid Hill's literary agent $96,250 in advances and
royalties on Hill's behalf, and was holding $27,958 for later payment to Hill. Simon &
Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 507.
30. Id. at 506; see NICHOLAS PILEGGI, WISEGUY: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY 19 (1985)
(discussing day-to-day life as a mobster, primarily in Hill's first-person narrative and recount-
ing Hill's conviction for extortion and his subsequent prison term).
31. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 507. The Board ordered Simon & Schuster to transfer
to the Board all payments due Hill, including the $27,958 held at that time, as well as all future
royalties. Id. at 507.
32. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 entitles a United States citizen to sue for damages in a civil
action if a law of any State or Territory of the U.S. causes that person to be subjected "to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982).
33. Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170,
178 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). The
district court was satisfied that the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom was no
greater than essential to achieve the state's important interest in compensating crime victims.
Id.
34. Simon & Schuster v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 784 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501
(1991). See generally Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O'Brien, Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment Challenge?, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1075 (1991). The court of appeals also held that the statute was not overbroad
or vague and thus passed Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at
780. Simon & Schuster did not advance the overbreadth and vagueness claims on appeal and
therefore this Note does not address these issues.
35. Simon & Schuster, 916 F.2d at 781-82.
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statute was narrowly tailored to accomplish New York's compelling interest
in ensuring that victims receive compensation directly from the assets of
their assailants.3 6
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision. 37 The Court
held that because the law placed a financial burden on speech based on its
content, the law was presumptively inconsistent with the First Amend-
ment.38 The majority reasoned that the statute, burdened with the presump-
tion of unconstitutionality, could stand only if it "serve[d] a compelling state
interest and [was] narrowly drawn to achieve that end.",39  The majority
characterized the state interest as ensuring that criminals did not profit from
selling their stories before their victims had an opportunity to recover civil
judgments. The Court held that this state interest was not compelling.'
However, the majority believed that a broader interest in not profiting from
their crimes was legitimate,4 and thus rejected the state's focus on only pro-
ceeds of storytelling.4 2
The majority determined the law to be overinclusive for two reasons.
First, the statute applied to all works, regardless of subject matter, as long as
the material contained some recollection of the criminal offense.4 3 Second,
the statute covered convicted criminals, as well as those authors who admit-
ted to having committed a crime, but were never convicted."
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority opinion
that the law was overinclusive, but criticized the majority for not explicitly
36. Id. at 782.
37. Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 512
(1991). Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia and Souter. Justices Blackmun and Kennedy each
wrote opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas was not involved in the considera-
tion or decision of the case.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 509 (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987)).
40. Id. at 510. Justice O'Connor held that the Board failed to show why New York had a
greater interest in compensating victims from the proceeds of storytelling over any of the crim-
inal's other assets. Id.
41. Id. at 510. The Court concluded only that the state's interest in "depriving criminals
of the profits of their crimes, and in using these funds to compensate victims" was legitimate.
Id.
42. Id. at 509-10.
43. Id. at 511. Because New York's Son of Sam law applied to works on any subject,
regardless of the quantity or relevance of the criminal's thoughts on his crime to the work, the
Court held the law to be overinclusive. Id.
44. Id. The statute included in its definition of a "person convicted of a crime," any
person who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a crime for which
such person is not prosecuted." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1982 & Supp.
1991).
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stating that the statute was underinclusive as well.45 In a separate opinion,
Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment.46 Justice Kennedy be-
lieved the Court should have struck down the statute as a pure censorship
measure.
47
This Note examines how the Supreme Court's characterization of the Son
of Sam law as a content-based regulation has made it virtually impossible for
criminal antiprofit laws to pass constitutional muster. This Note first traces
the traditional and alternative analyses applied to First Amendment issues.
Next, this Note reviews the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Board and determines that the Court should have characterized the Son of
Sam law as a combined speech and nonspeech regulation and applied a less
exacting standard of review. This Note evaluates the reasons behind the
suggested characterization of the Son of Sam law as a combined speech and
nonspeech regulation, including several public policy issues that support the
use of a lower standard of review. Finally, this Note analyzes the Son of
Sam law under the alternative standard and concludes that the statute passes
constitutional examination.
I. TRADITIONAL FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court applies different standards of review depending upon
the particular type of free speech issue. The Court has recognized that gov-
ernment regulations can chill free speech directly, indirectly or inciden-
tally.48 Under traditional First Amendment analysis, a court must first
45. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512 (Blackmun, J., concurring). While Justice Black-
mun's concurrence does not state the reasons why he believes the statute is underinclusive,
presumably this flaw results from the reach of the statute to only criminals who profit from
storytelling rather than all criminals.
46. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
47. Id. Justice Kennedy believed it was unnecessary and incorrect to apply a balancing
test to determine if the statute could withstand strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. Id.
Justice Kennedy stated that the compelling state interest test is derived from equal protection
jurisprudence and has no legitimate role in determining the constitutionality of content-based
speech regulations. Id.
48. If a regulation is found to directly regulate speech, the statute will be subject to strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987) (hold-
ing that Arkansas' tax on certain types of magazines was a content-based speech regulation
and invalid under the First Amendment); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-649 (1984)
(invalidating a law making it a crime to photograph any obligation or other security of the
United States because "[a] determination as to the newsworthiness or educational value of a
photograph cannot help but be based on the content of the photo and the message it deliv-
ers."); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content. The Peculiar
Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 81, 81-82 (1978) (stating that except
for "low value" speech, such as fighting words or obscenity, the United States Supreme Court
has employed standards that are strongly speech protective).
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classify whether the statute directly regulates the protected speech,49
whether it is based on other content-neutral factors,5  or whether it com-
bines speech and nonspeech elements.51
Incidental burdens and time, place and manner restrictions on speech do not require exact-
ing scrutiny as long as they are content-neutral, not aimed at the communicative effect of the
conduct and allow for alternative avenues of communication. See, e.g., City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (regulations that indirectly effect expression and are neutral in regard to the type of
speech affected are constitutional); see also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50-51
(1961).
[G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but inci-
dentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the
First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they
have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequi-
site to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmen-
tal interest involved.
Id. at 50-51.
49. See Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 234 (invalidating as content-based a statute
that taxes magazines containing general interest articles while exempting religious, profes-
sional, trade and sports journals); Regan, 468 U.S. at 648-49 (invalidiating as content-based a
statute prohibiting photographic reproductions of currency while allowing educational, histor-
ical, or newsworthy reproductions); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)
(invalidating as content-based a statute forbidding peaceful picketing near a school while al-
lowing picketing that involves a labor dispute); cf Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48 (narrowing the
test for content-based regulations to one where regulations have the "predominent intent" and
not the "secondary effects" of regulating speech on the basis of content).
50. Incidental burdens and time, place, and manner restrictions on speech do not require
strict scrutiny as long as they are content-neutral, not aimed at the communicative effect of the
conduct, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Renton, 475 U.S. at
46-47; see Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1445 (1991) (holding a statute extending
Arkansas' generally applicable sales tax to cable and satellite services, while exempting the
print media, valid as a content-neutral tax differential regulation as it in no way regulates the
content of mass media communications); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803
(1989) (holding that New York City's sound-amplification guideline was a valid content-neu-
tral time, place and manner restriction because the city had a substantial interest in avoiding
excessive sound volume for the community living in the vicinity of the concert ground); Ren-
ton, 475 U.S. at 54 (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting adult movie theaters from locat-
ing near residential zones, churches, parks or schools was a valid content-neutral time, place
and manner restriction because the city had a substantial interest in preserving the quality of
urban life); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984)
(holding that a regulation denying protestors the right to sleep overnight in specified parks was
a valid content-neutral time, place and manner restriction because the city had a substantial
interest in maintaining its parks in an attractive and intact condition).
51. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-90 (1985) (holding that a statute
making it unlawful to reenter a military base after being barred from the base by an officer in
command or charge was valid as a content-neutral regulation that was necessary to maintain
base security); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984) (holding an
ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property valid as a content-neutral regula-
tion that was justified by the city's substantial interest in advancing esthetic values); O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 376 (holding that a statute prohibiting the burning of draft cards, an action with
combined speech and non-speech elements, was only an incidental burden on speech).
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A. Content Based Regulations
If a court finds that a statute treats one class of publication differently
than another solely because of the publication's content, the court will most
likely conclude that the statute violates the First Amendment.52 Courts use
a strict standard of review to determine the validity of such a law. A con-
tent-based regulation is constitutional only if it is a narrowly-tailored means
of serving a compelling state interest. 53 A statute is not narrowly tailored if
a less restrictive structure would achieve the identical state interest.54
In Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,5 the Supreme Court held
that even though there was no evidence of an improper censorial motive, an
Arkansas tax burdened rights protected by the First Amendment by dis-
criminating against a select group of magazines.56 Arkansas imposed a tax
on revenue derived from the sale of tangible property, but exempted a vari-
ety of items, including newspapers and various journals.57 The Arkansas
Commissioner of Revenue, however, assessed a tax on the sale of the Arkan-
sas Times magazine.5 ' Arkansas Writers' Project, the publishers of the mag-
azine, argued that the magazine was exempt from the tax because it fell
within one of the statutory exceptions.59 Arguing alternatively, Arkansas
Writers' Project claimed that the tax violated the First Amendment because
52. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988). The Court stated that the government's
burden to justify a statute subject to strict scrutiny "is well-nigh insurmountable." Id. See
generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189 (1983) (comparing content-based with content-neutral analysis).
53. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(holding a regulation granting exclusive access of certified teacher union to interschool mail
system valid as a narrowly tailored means of enabling the union to perform effectively its
statutory obligations as representative of all township teachers); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) (invalidating a prohibition against the inclu-
sion by public utility companies in monthly bills of inserts that discussed controversial issues
of public policy as a content-based regulation not narrowly drawn to protect a captive audi-
ence since customers could escape exposure to the material in several different ways, i.e.,
throwing inserts into trashcan upon receipt); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786
(1978) (holding a criminal statute which prohibits corporations from making contributions for
the purpose of influencing voters, on issues other than with which it is materially affected by,
invalid as not narrowly tailored because the statute only applies to banks and corporations and
exempts not-for-profit agencies and labor unions); see also, TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-3 at
797-804.
55. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
56. Id. at 234.
57. 1935 ARK. GEN. AcTs 233, § 4 at 593, 594 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-
1903(a) (1980 & Supp. 1985)). Arkansas exempted specialty journals such as professional,
religious, and sports magazines. Id.
58. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 224-25.
59. Id. at 225. Arkansas Writers' Project argued that the Arkansas Times published arti-
cles on a variety of subjects, including religion and sports, both of which were subjects exempt
from the tax. Id.
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it placed an economic burden on speech based solely on the content of the
speech. 60
The Supreme Court found that the Arkansas tax was a content-based
speech regulation because it selectively imposed a tax on some magazines
and not others, solely on the basis of the magazines' subject matter. 61 Ac-
cordingly, the Court applied a strict standard of review and invalidated the
content-based regulation. 62 The Court concluded that Arkansas was unable
to justify the means chosen to pursue its compelling interest of raising reve-
nue, because Arkansas could have raised revenues by an overall tax adjust-
ment on all businesses.6a
In certain circumstances, however, the Court will uphold content-based
regulations if the compelling state interest justifies the speech restriction. In
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,"M the Court held that a Cleveland suburb
could prohibit the posting of political or public issue advertisements on its
city buses.65 Shaker Heights purposely limited access to its transit system
advertising space in order to minimize abuses, such as favoritism to particu-
lar parties and imposing upon a captive audience.66 The Court did not view
this statute as within the forum of the First Amendment because "car cards"
are not considered to be a public forum and therefore First Amendment
freedoms do not extend to them.67 The Court reasoned that the legislative
objective of curbing abuse was legitimate, and that the statute treated
equally all persons or organizations seeking advertising space.68 Thus, the
Court found no First Amendment violation.69 In contrast, a statute that
does not limit, and is justified without reference to, the content of expression
constitutes content-neutral speech regulation and is subjected to a less exact-
ing level of review than strict scrutiny.
60. Id. at 229.
61. Id. "[T]his case involves a ... disturbing use of selective taxation . . . because the
basis on which Arkansas differentiates between the magazines is particularly repugnant to
First Amendment principles: a magazine's tax status depends entirely on its content." Id.
62. Id. at 234.
63. Id. at 231 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983)).
64. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
65. Id. at 303.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687 (1985) (holding re-entry
statute valid as applied to all persons receiving a valid bar letter); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 839 (1976) (upholding a prohibition of partisan political activities on a military post be-
cause the policy was "objectively and evenhandedly applied" and did not discriminate among
candidate's political views).
69. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304.
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B. Content-Neutral Regulations
The Supreme Court has adopted a lower standard of review for statutes
that indirectly burden speech while regulating a legitimate state interest.
70
The Court defines content-neutral speech regulations as those that are "justi-
fied without reference to the content of the regulated speech."' 7 1 In contrast
to its harsh treatment of content-based regulations, 72 the Court has upheld
numerous content-neutral regulations reasoning that the regulations were
aimed at restricting the secondary effects that accompany a particular kind
of speech rather than suppressing the speech itself." The controlling consid-
eration is the government's purpose in enacting the regulation.74
In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. ,7 the Supreme Court held that a
zoning ordinance restricting the location of adult movie theaters was com-
patible with the First Amendment. 76 The City of Renton passed an ordi-
nance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating within
1,000 feet of any residential zone, school, church or park.77 Two owners of
adult theaters filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief blocking en-
forcement of the ordinance.7 a
The Court established a three-prong test to determine the validity of a
content-neutral statute79 aimed at the secondary effects of speech.8' First,
70. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 581 (1983). As long as the regulation has a legitimate purpose and does not act to prevent
speech, the Supreme Court will tolerate incidental infringements upon free speech. Id.; see
also TRIBE, supra note 12, at 814.
71. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
72. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 75-98 and accompanying text.
74. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The government's purpose
is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages
but not others."); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he
inquiry into the purpose of the legislature in enacting a moment of silence law should be defer-
ential and limited."). See generally Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal Constitutional Adju-
dication, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1887, 1887-88 n.l (1970).
75. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
76. Id.; see also Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (up-
holding city regulation controlling location of adult theaters as valid due to the state's ade-
quate interest in protecting the character of the neighborhoods).
77. Renton, 475 U.S. at 44.
78. Id.
79. The Court defined a content-neutral statute as one "justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech." Id. at 48. The statute at issue was aimed not at the content
of adult films per se, but at the secondary effects of adult theaters on the surrounding commu-
nity. Id.
80. Id. at 50. "The principle inquiry in determining content neutrality.., is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Further, "[a] regulation
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the city must have a substantial interest at stake.8 1 Second, the law must be
narrowly tailored to further that interest, but need not be the least intrusive
means of regulating the speech.82 Third, the statute must allow for alterna-
tive avenues of communication. 3 Although the law singled out only adult
movie theaters, the Court held that the City's interest in perpetuating the
quality of living was sufficiently compelling to justify the law.8 4 The Court
also found the statute to be narrowly tailored because it affected only those
theaters that threatened the quality of urban life.85 Finally, the Court deter-
mined that by allowing adult theaters to operate on several hundred acres of
land, the city provided a reasonable alternative means of communication. 6
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,7 the Supreme Court utilized the stan-
dard of review adopted in Renton and held that New York City's sound-
amplification guideline was valid under the First Amendment as a reason-
that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others." Id.
In Renton, the Court stated that "[t]he appropriate inquiry... is whether the Renton ordi-
nance is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable alter-
native avenues of communication." Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. Under the Renton test, once a
regulation is determined to be content-neutral, the Court determines if it is designed to serve a
vital governmental objective, whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to affect only the
targeted class shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects, and whether there is an alter-
native forum from which the speech may be lawfully expressed. See Andrea Oser, Note, Moti-
vation Analysis in Light of Renton, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 344, 346-50 (1987).
81. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental
Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV.
917 (1988) (providing an analysis and overview of "interests asserted by the government in
support of restricting an individual's constitutional rights").
82. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. The standard to be applied under Renton is not a least-
restrictive analysis test. "So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than nec-
essary to achieve the government's interest, however, the regulation will not be invalid simply
because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some
less-speech-restrictive alternative." Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 (applying the Renton content-neu-
tral speech regulation test to determine the validity of a sound-amplification guideline).
A "less-restrictive-alternative analysis ... has never been a part of the inquiry into the
validity of a time, place, and manner regulation." Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 657
(1984); cf supra note 54 (indicating that the strict scrutiny "narrowly tailored" requirement
employs a "least-restrictive" analysis test).
83. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. The Court has applied this requirement to mean whether any
alternative arenas are available that would lawfully permit the regulated speech to be ex-
pressed. Specifically, in Renton, the Court addressed the plausibility of the alternative theater
sites, ie., whether they were remote, accessible by car, occupied by well-established businesses,
or unsuited for development. Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54; see Oser, supra note 80, at 350.
84. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51 (citing Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 71
(1976)).
85. Id. at 52.
86. Id. at 53. The ordinance left more than five percent of the entire land area of Renton
available for use as adult theater sites. Id.
87. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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able regulation of protected speech."8 After receiving numerous complaints
from citizens regarding the excessive noise level from concerts held in Cen-
tral Park by the musical association Rock Against Racism (RAR), New
York City adopted a volume control regulation, which specified that the
City would furnish high quality sound equipment and retain an independent
and experienced sound technician for all performances.8 9 RAR sued New
York City, arguing that the guideline was invalid under the First
Amendment. 9'
Determining that the regulation was content-neutral because it was justi-
fied without reference to the content of the speech,9 the Court applied the
Renton three-part test. First, the Court found that the City had a substan-
tial interest in protecting citizens from unwelcome and excessive noise.92
Second, the City's interest in limiting sound volume is served in a direct and
effective way by the requirement that the City's sound technician control the
mixing board during performances.93 Third, the regulation allowed for am-
ple alternative channels of communication because it did not attempt to ban
any particular manner or type of music at a given place and time.
94
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that, despite an indirect effect on
speech, certain regulations do not warrant First Amendment protection if
there is a valid reason for their existence. If the regulation is aimed at a
nonspeech activity, with the purpose of raising specific tax revenues for ex-
ample, the Court may remove the regulation from First Amendment analy-
sis altogether. In Leathers v. Medlock,9 5 the Court held that Arkansas'
extension of its generally applicable sales tax to cable television services
alone, or to cable and satellite services, while exempting the print media, did
not violate the First Amendment.9 6 A cable television subscriber, a cable
operator, and a cable trade organization brought suit contending that the
extension of the tax to cable services and the exemption from the tax of
88. Id. at 803.
89. Id. at 784. Each year Rock Against Racism, an association dedicated to the espousal
and promotion of antiracist views, sponsors a program of speeches and rock music at the
Bandshell. Id.
90. Id. at 787-88. The Appellant argued that the guideline violated the First Amendment
because it restricted the group's free expression of music. Id.
91. Id. at 792. The Court stated that the city's desire to control noise "in order to retain
the character of the Sheep Meadow and its more sedate activities, and to avoid undue intrusion
into residential areas and other areas of the park" was not content based. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 800.
94. Id. at 783. While the law did regulate the volume of the protected speech, it contin-
ued to permit expressive activity and had no effect on the quantity or content of that speech.
Id.
95. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
96. Id. at 1447.
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newspapers and magazines violated their First Amendment rights.97 The
Court determined that even though cable television was engaged in
"speech," the fact that the government taxed cable television differently
from other media did not by itself raise First Amendment concerns.9" The
Court held that the tax was one of general applicability, covering all tangible
personal property and a broad range of services, which included more than
the press. 99 Instead of developing legislation that regulates speech itself,
based either on its content (content-based) or on other factors (content-neu-
tral), the government may attempt to regulate the nonspeech elements of
certain expressive conduct.
C. Regulating the Noncommunicative Impact of Expressive Conduct
The government may incidentally regulate speech by attempting to re-
strict a nonspeech activity. This type of speech regulation, while aimed at
the non-communicative conduct, has the effect of regulating corresponding
speech elements.ic°
The Supreme Court, in United States v. O'Brien,"° ' held that when speech
and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a suffi-
ciently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.'" 2 O'Brien
burned his Selective Service registration certificate as a symbol of his opposi-
tion to the Vietnam War.1 3 O'Brien was arrested and subsequently con-
victed of violating the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which
made it a crime for any person to knowingly destroy or alter a registration
certificate." O'Brien argued affirmatively that the Act violated the First
Amendment because it abridged free speech and served no legitimate legisla-
tive purpose. 1
0 5
97. Id. at 1441.
98. Id. at 1442; cf Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (hold-
ing that Arkansas' tax on certain types of magazines was a content-based speech regulation
and invalid under the First Amendment).
99. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444.
100. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see also Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,
478 U.S. 697 (1986) (stating that the conduct regulated had no communicative element and the
regulation was not aimed at suppressing speech indirectly, thus, the First Amendment pro-
vided no protection).
101. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
102. Id. at 375.
103. Id. at 367.
104. Id. at 369; see 50 U.S.C. § 462(b) (1988) (making it illegal to forge, alter, knowingly
destroy or mutilate any military certificate).
105. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367. O'Brien's argument was that the freedom of expression
which the First Amendment guarantees included all modes of communication of ideas by con-
duct. Id.
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The Court upheld the statute and formulated a four-part test for deter-
mining whether a government regulation is sufficiently justified in this con-
text.'°6 First, the regulation must be within the constitutional power of the
government. °7 Second, the regulation must further an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest. 108 Third, the governmental interest must be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.' " Fourth, the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms must not be greater than is
essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest. 110
The O'Brien Court found that the government had both the power to reg-
ulate.' and a substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of
issued Selective Service Certificates."I2 The Court found 50 U.S.C. § 462 to
be an appropriately narrow means of protecting this interest because only
the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within the Act's
reach was regulated. 1 3 Because the noncommunicative impact of O'Brien's
106. Id. at 376. The O'Brien test applies where "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct." Id. The Court has held that where a statute im-
poses only an incidental limitation on speech, i.e., it only regulates non-expressive conduct, a
less exacting standard of review is applied. Id.
107. Id. at 377. The starting point for the Court in assessing the validity of an incidental
burden on speech is determining whether the legislature had the power to pass the law in the
first place. Id. With regard to federal statutes, Congress has the authority to regulate an array
of areas, including monetary policies, commerce, immigration, the military and others deemed
necessary and proper. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
108. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 380-81. The legislation under review must serve to attain a
substantial government interest. See supra notes 20, 74. To determine this interest, the Court
looks to the language of the statute and its legislative history. See Renton v. Playtime Thea-
ters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986).
109. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 381-82. After determining what particular governmental
interest the statute is designed to achieve, the court must evaluate whether this interest relates
to the suppression of free speech or to other non-expressive conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (holding that the government had a substantial interest in
prohibiting persons perviously banned from re-entering military bases in an effort to minimize
destruction of government property).
110. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 382. The final prong of the O'Brien test requires the regula-
tion to achieve the required result (i.e., the substantial governmental objective). Id.; see Alber-
tini, 472 U.S. at 689 (stating this fourth element as the determination that the substantial
governmental interest "would be achieved less effectively absent the [statute]"); see also supra
note 82 (indicating that the least-restrictive-means test is not to be applied with the Renton test
or with the O'Brien test).
111. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. "The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support
armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping." Id.
112. Id. at 377-78. The availability of the certificates for display to prove a young man's
registration with the Selective Service relieved the system "of the administrative burden it
would otherwise have in verifying the registration and classification of all suspected delin-
quents." Id. at 378.
113. Id. at 377. The law simply prevented the destruction of the certificates which was
precisely its intent. Id. at 380. There appears to be no more narrowly tailored means to
achieving this end then the subject regulation. Id. at 381.
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burning of his registration certificate frustrated the government's interest, 114
the Court found the interest sufficient to justify O'Brien's conviction.' 5
II. A CATEGORICAL APPROACH - ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES IN
INFRINGEMENT ON FREE SPEECH CASES
Although the Supreme Court has not formally set forth an alternative
standard of review for alleged speech infringement cases that fall outside
traditional First Amendment analysis, the Court has rendered decisions in
such cases based on non-traditional norms. Rather than utilizing the tradi-
tional tests for content-based,' 1 6 content-neutral" 7 and combined speech
and nonspeech regulations," 8 the Court has employed a "limited categorical
approach" as part of its First Amendment analysis." 9
In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. ,20 the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment did not bar enforcement of a statute that authorized closure of
a building utilized for both an adult bookstore and solicitation of prostitu-
tion. 2 ' An investigation of the subject adult bookstore uncovered the oper-
ation of a prostitution ring on the premises.'22 The New York statute
authorized the closure of a building found to be a public health nuisance
because prostitutes used the building as their place of business.' 23 The
Court held that the First Amendment did not bar enforcement of the closure
statute because legislation providing the closure sanction was directed at
unlawful conduct having nothing to do with books or other expressive
activity.114
In Branzburg v. Hayes,'25 the Court held that the judiciary could require
newspaper reporters to testify before a grand jury as to the identity of their
sources, even if the reporter had guaranteed anonymity to the informant.' 26
114. Id. at 382. The purpose of the law was not to prevent protestors from demonstrating
against the war, but to prevent the willful mutilation and destruction of the certificates.
115. Id. at 377, 386.
116. See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 70-99 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 100-115 and accompanying text.
119. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543 (1992) (stating that
certain categories of expression do not receive full First Amendment protection). The new
categories of less protected speech include "commercial speech, near-obscene and offensive
speech ... defamation, and possibly the speech of public employees." TRIBE, supra note 12,
§ 12-18, at 930.
120. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
121. Id. at 707.
122. Id. at 699.
123. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2320, 2329 (McKinney 1985).
124. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707.
125. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
126. Id. at 708.
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The journalists contended that the refusal to apply Kentucky's reporters'
privilege statute would deter future informants from providing information,
and in turn would preclude reporters from publication due to lack of rele-
vant information.127 The Court held that because it was impossible to deter-
mine the extent of deterrence on informers and reporters, 128 the public
interest in prosecuting crimes outweighed the public interest in possible fu-
ture news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources.129 The Court
held that the evidence indicated that some of the informers would still be
motivated to speak despite the risk of exposure because of the desire to pub-
licize their viewpoints. '
30
Arcara and Branzburg illustrate that with respect to certain categories of
expression, the Supreme Court has indicated a greater willingness to uphold
regulations that affect speech when the underlying public policy objectives
outweigh the possible infringement of freedom of expression. 131 The Court
has identified other categories of speech that require special consideration of
the policy reasons behind the speech regulation to determine the level of
scrutiny to be applied. 132 The utilization of a more flexible standard of re-
view in specific types of First Amendment issues is in the best interest of
127. Id. at 680.
128. Id. at 693-94. The Court found estimates of the impact of such subpoenas on the
willingness of informants to come forward "widely divergent and to a great extent specula-
tive." Id.
129. Id. at 695, 700.
130. Id. at 693-95; see also Sue S. Okuda, Comment, Criminal Antiprofit Laws: Some
Thoughts in Favor of Their Constitutionality, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1363-64 (1988) (emphasiz-
ing the Branzburg Court's observation that "the informer is often a member of a 'minority
political or cultural group [which] relies heavily on the media to propagate its views, publicize
its aims, and magnify its exposure to the public.'" (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694-95)).
131. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707 (asserting that "[b]ookselling in an establishment used for
prostitution does not confer First Amendment coverage to defeat a valid statute aimed at
penalizing and terminating illegal uses of premises"); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695 (holding that
the public interest in obtaining information relating to prosecution of crime outweighs the
burden on news gathering resulting from requiring reporters to disclose confidential informa-
tion). The Branzburg Court, quotes Wigmore's statement that "[n]o pledge of privacy nor
oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a court of justice." Id. at 682 n.21
(quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (1961)).
132. While a detailed discussion of these areas is beyond the scope of this Note, the Court's
application of the commercial speech and fighting words doctrine highlights its willingness to
apply a more relaxed standard of review in certain circumstances. For example, the Supreme
Court has indicated a desire to uphold profit-motivated speech regulations that infringe on free
speech but serve legitimate purposes. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
456 (1978) (holding that the Constitution affords "commercial speech a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment
values").
Further, the theory of the regulation of "fighting words" is not contrary to the theory of the
free marketplace of ideas because this category of speech triggers an automatic, unthinking
reaction, rather than a consideration of an idea. See TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-18 at 928-29.
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justice and society overall. The policy concerns underlying the Son of Sam
law certainly deserve this type of consideration.
III. SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC V. MEMBERS OF THE NEW YORK STATE
CRIME VICTIMS BOARD: APPLYING A STRICT SCRUTINY
STANDARD OF REVIEW TO CRIMINAL
ANTIPROFIT LAWS
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Vic-
tims Board,13 3 the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upholding the Son of Sam law.'
34
The Court struck down the criminal antiprofit law as inconsistent with the
First Amendment. 13  Although a six member majority found the state's
compelling interest in compensating victims from the proceeds of a crime
legitimate, 136 the Court held that the law was unconstitutional because it
placed a financial burden on particular speech based solely upon the content
of that speech. 137 Because of the number of states that have adopted legisla-
tion similar to the Son of Sam law, it is crucial to examine why the Supreme
Court invalidated the Son of Sam law and to determine what steps can be
taken to remedy this inequitable result. An analysis of the Simon & Schuster
opinion is the appropriate starting point.
A. Majority Opinion: Son of Sam Law Unable to Withstand Strict
Scrutiny When Characterized as a Content-Based Regulation
The Supreme court reversed the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 138 The majority began by reviewing the his-
tory of the Son of Sam law and laying out the precise operation of the stat-
ute.' 39 Focusing on the First Amendment challenge, the Court stated that a
regulation carries a presumption of unconstitutionality if it economically
burdens speakers because of the content of their speech.'" The Court em-
phasized the importance of this principle by noting that the government can
readily dictate the ideas and viewpoints of the marketplace by imposing con-
tent-based speech regulations.'
4 1
133. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
134. Id. at 507-08.
135. Id. at 512.
136. Id. at 509-10.
137. Id. at 512.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 504-06.
140. Id. at 508 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991)).
141. Id. at 508 (citing Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444).
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Reasoning that the law singled out income derived from expressive activ-
ity and thereby placed a burden on that income that the law placed on no
other income, the Court explicitly labeled the Son of Sam law as a content-
based regulation.' 42 The necessary result, that Simon & Schuster could only
publish books about crime if the criminal-turned-author would be willing to
forgo payment for five years, plainly imposed a financial disincentive on
speech with a particular content.1
43
The Court rejected the State Crime Victims Board's attempt to distinguish
the Son of Sam law from the discriminatory tax at issue in Arkansas Writers'
Project.'" The Court stated that the statute's procedure of escrowing the
criminal's proceeds from storytelling rather than taxing it outright as in Ar-
kansas Writers' Project was not sufficient to differentiate the Son of Sam law
to obtain different review under the First Amendment. 45
The majority next rejected the Board's argument that the statute should
not be subjected to strict scrutiny because Simon & Schuster failed to show
that the New York legislature intended to suppress particular ideas. '46 In an
attempt to have the Son of Sam law reviewed under a lower standard, the
Board argued that only statutes that intend to suppress certain ideas are
considered suspect and examined under strict scrutiny.'47 The Court re-
jected this argument and held that regulations aimed at proper governmental
objectives can also violate the First Amendment. 148 The Court also dis-
agreed with the Board's final argument, which was an attempt to differenti-
ate a content-based regulation aimed specifically at the media from the Son
of Sam law, which imposed a general burden on any "entity" contracting
142. Id. at 508.
143. Id. The Court stated:
Whether the First Amendment "speaker" is considered to be Henry Hill, whose in-
come the statute places in escrow because of the story he has told, or Simon &
Schuster, which can publish books about crime with the assistance of only those
criminals willing to forgo remuneration for at least five years, the statute plainly
imposes a financial disincentive only on speech of a particular content.
Id.
144. Id; see supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. The Court said that the difference
between holding funds in an escrow account for five years and taxing a percentage of it out-
right is unimportant. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508. Both forms of financial burden act
as disincentives to speak. Id.
145. Id. The majority believed that "[b]oth forms of financial burden operate as disincen-
tives to speak." Id. But see infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
146. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509. The majority stated that " '[i]llicit legislative
intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of a the First Amendment.'" Id. (quoting Minne-
apolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983) (hold-
ing that an improper censorial motive need not be present to invalidate a speech regulation
under the First Amendment)).
147. Id.
148. Id.; see, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 592-93 (1983); Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987).
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with a convicted person to tell his story. 149 The Court stated that any "en-
tity" that contracts with a criminal-turned-author becomes a medium of
communication and is therefore entitled to First Amendment protection.
50
After characterizing the Son of Sam law as a content-based regulation, the
majority applied a strict scrutiny standard of review.' 5 ' This stringent stan-
dard requires that the state objective, sufficiently vital to justify an infringe-
ment of free speech, be achieved by a regulation designed to include only
persons in the subject class.' 52 The Court held that New York had a dual
compelling interest, 153 first in ensuring that victims of crime received com-
pensation from those who harmed them"' and second, that criminals not
profit from their crimes. -5  The Court, however, rejected the Board's at-
tempt to narrow this dual interest of protecting a victim's opportunity to
recover from his or her assailant before the criminal profits from the pro-
ceeds of his crime.'5 6 The majority stated that the Board was unable to
show why New York had a greater interest in compensating victims from
the proceeds of the "storytelling" than from any of the criminal's other as-
sets. 157 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the state's compelling inter-
149. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509.
150. Id. The Court held that the "argument falters on both semantic and constitutional
grounds," id., and concluded that the identity of the speaker was irrelevant in the considera-
tion of the validity of a content-based speech regulation. Id.; see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991) (stating that "enforcement of... general laws against the press is
not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or
organizations.").
15 1. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509. The Court held that in order to justify the
financial disincentive to create or publish works about a criminal's thoughts, feelings, opinions,
or beliefs about a particular crime, New York had the burden to show that the Son of Sam law
could survive a strict scrutiny standard of review. Id.
152. Id. The majority stated that to justify differential treatment for works with a specified
content, " 'the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' " Id. (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231).
153. Id. at 509-10. It is important to note that the majority opinion expressly acknowl-
edged that New York's interest clearly was not to curtail Henry Hill from telling his story.
154. Id. at 509. The majority acknowledged that every state has a body of tort law that is
designed to compensate crime victims. The Court also cited the existence of prejudgment
remedies and orders of restitution as further evidence of this compelling interest. Id. at 509-
10.
155. Id. at 510. This interest is further protected by New York's statutory provisions for
the forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R.
§§ 1310-1352 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
156. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510. Specifically, the proceeds from the offender's
crime in this instance is the asset created by selling the rights to his or her story.
157. Id. The Board was also unable to offer any justification for a distinction between
storytelling and any other activity with respect to its interest of transferring the proceeds of
crime from an offender to his victim. Id.
1993]
Catholic University Law Review
est was simply aimed at compensating victims from the proceeds of the
crime committed against them.'
In deciding whether the Son of Sam law was narrowly tailored to advance
New York's compelling interest, the majority examined the authors and
works covered by the law.' 59 First, the law's broad definition of "person
convicted of a crime" enabled the Board to escrow the income of any author
who admitted committing a crime, whether or not the criminal-turned-au-
thor was ever convicted."6 In addition, the statute applied to any work that
contained the "thoughts, feelings, [and] opinions" of the author's crime. 16 1
The Court held that these two provisions served to make the statute overin-
clusive and therefore invalid as not narrowly tailored utilizing a strict scru-
tiny standard of review. 162 The majority provided several examples of works
that would be covered by the Son of Sam law, including The Autobiography
of Malcolm X, the Confessions of Saint Augustine, and works by Martin Lu-
ther King.'
63
The majority concluded by reiterating the Court's position that the Son of
Sam law singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden the
law placed on no other speech, 64 and that while New York's interest in
compensating victims from the proceeds of crime was compelling, the statute
was not tailored narrowly enough to withstand strict scrutiny review.' 6 5
B. Concurring Opinions: Son of Sam Law Judged Underinclusive and a
Pure Censorship Measure
Writing separately, two Justices concurred in the judgment. Justice Black-
mun asserted that the statute was underinclusive 66 and Justice Kennedy
stated that the balancing test the Court utilized should be reserved for equal
protection jurisprudence and not for free speech issues. 167 In a three sen-
tence concurrence, Justice Blackmun stated that the Son of Sam law was
158. Id. at 511.
159. Id. at 511-12. The Court believed that the regulation covered far too many authors
and works. Id. at 511. The majority cited, for example, The Autobiography of Malcolm X and
Thoreau's Civil Disobedience as works falling under the Son of Sam law. Id.
160. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l)(10)(b) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
161. Id. § 632-a(1).
162. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct at 511-12.
163. Id. at 511. The Court acknowledged that a statute like the Son of Sam law would not
prevent the publication of all of these works, because some would have been written without
compensation. The main flaw, the majority asserted, was that the regulation reached a wide
range of literature that did not enable a criminal to profit from his crime while a victim re-
mained uncompensated. Id.
164. Id. at 512.
165. Id.
166. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 512-13 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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underinclusive as well as overinclusive and that the Court should have stated
so in order to provide guidance to other states who have enacted similar
legislation. 16
In a separate concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that it was unnecessary
and incorrect for the majority to use a balancing test to render the content-
based regulation unconstitutional.169 Justice Kennedy argued that, instead,
the Court should have invalidated the Son of Sam law as a pure censorship
measure in that it imposed restrictions on authors and publishers solely on
the basis of the content of the literature. 170 Justice Kennedy stated that the
use of a compelling justification standard was dangerous in that states might
infer that they may censor speech whenever they believe there is a legitimate
reason for doing so that outweighs the interference with free speech.'1
7  Jus-
tice Kennedy asserted that the Son of Sam law "amount[ed] to raw censor-
ship" forbidden by the First Amendment and should have been struck
down. 172
IV. CRIMINAL ANTI-PROFIT LAWS: INVALIDITY UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT VIRTUALLY GUARANTEED AFTER
Simon & Schuster
The Supreme Court's characterization of the Sam of Sam law as a content-
based regulation has made it virtually impossible for criminal antiprofit laws
to pass constitutional muster. Reviewing the Son of Sam law under strict
scrutiny, the Court determined the statute to be overinclusive and therefore
not narrowly tailored.' 73 Only if the law is characterized as a regulation
aimed at conduct containing both speech and nonspeech elements, and con-
168. Id. at 512 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 512 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated that the balancing for-
mulation is derived from equal protection analysis and is not applicable when deciding
whether a state may place a restriction on speech based only on content. Justice Kennedy did
allude to the fact that the balancing test may be appropriate when reviewing a content-neutral
or time, place, and manner speech regulation. Id.
170. Id. at 515. Justice Kennedy concluded that the Son of Sam law was directed at speech
that was not obscene, defamatory or otherwise criminal and therefore no further inquiry was
necessary to determine that the statute was invalid as a content-based speech regulation. Id. at
514-15.
171. Id. at 513.
172. Id. at 515.
173. Id. at 511 (majority opinion). The Court determined the law to be overinclusive be-
cause it covered such a large number of works. Thus, even under the more lenient tailoring
standards of Renton and Ward, a regulation is deemed not narrowly tailored if" 'a substantial
portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance [the State's content-neutral]
goals' ". Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
Had the majority applied the Renton three-part test for content-neutral regulations, it would
probably have agreed that New York had a compelling interest in compensating victims from
the proceeds of crime and that the statute allowed for alternative avenues of communication.
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sequently analyzed under O'Brien,' can states who have adopted antiprofit
statutes based on the Son of Sam law achieve their goal of compensating
victims from the proceeds of crime.
A. Characterizing the Son of Sam Law as a Regulation of Conduct
Containing Speech and Nonspeech Elements Rather Than a
Content-Based Speech Regulation
A key consideration in determining the validity of the Son of Sam law is
the level of First Amendment protection to be afforded to a criminal's liter-
ary work.'" Courts must determine whether the challenged statute deters
criminals from telling their stories by regulating the content of their
speech. 176 Then, even if deterrence occurs, such interference may be consti-
tutional if the restrictions are classified as either content-neutral or are aimed
at combined speech and nonspeech elements and the law's purpose is not
solely to prevent the criminal from telling his story.
17 7
An argument can be made that the Son of Sam law is directed not at the
content of speech, but at the financial transaction between the criminal and
some entity, and therefore has only an incidental effect on speech.
1. "The Strangler-Sally's Story": An Illustration
Sally the Strangler is a serial killer who has been arrested and convicted.
Sally's best friend contracts with Publisher A to write a book entitled "The
Strangler-Sally's Story," which will trace Sally's life of crime and will in-
clude several reenactments of actual strangulations. A world-renowned
criminologist contracts with Publisher B to write the same story, hypotheti-
However, the Court would again determine that the Son of Sam law was overinclusive because
it covered too many authors and too many works.
174. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see also notes 101-15 and accompany-
ing text.
175. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.7, at
17 (1986). The majority of the Court has never explicitly adopted an absolutist view of free
speech. Id. at 20. Instead the Court determines "the strength of First Amendment rights in
relation to the other individual rights." Id. at 19-20.
176. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963); see also New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open .... "). But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
70 (1976) (holding that society's interest in protecting sexually explicit films, which are not
obscene, "is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate").
177. Cf First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (upholding Massachusetts crimi-
nal statute prohibiting corporations from expressing their views on referendum questions if
such issues are not directly related to their business interests); Linmark Assoc. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85 (1977) (upholding community prohibition of posting "for sale" signs); Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (upholding ordinance prohibiting non-labor
picketing in the vicinity of a school).
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cally word for word. Sally contracts with Publisher C to sell the rights of
her story to be written by a ghost writer, also the same story, hypothetically
word for word. Applying the Son of Sam law, the statute would only be
applicable to the contract between Sally and Publisher C. Both Sally's best
friend and the criminologist can write and publish the same story Sally
would contract to write, without giving a penny to the State Victim's Crime
Board. 7 8 Further, if Sally opts to write her story without receiving any
compensation, the Son of Sam law is completely circumvented.' 79 As a re-
sult, the public has not been deprived of Sally's story-Sally has simply been
prevented from profiting from her crimes before her victims have had the
opportunity to be compensated.
The Son of Sam law does not vest the Board with discretion to examine
the content of the criminal's speech to determine if the story is offensive or if
the reenactment of the crime is a major or minor part of the story. ' 80 As the
district court determined, the Board's inquiry is an objective one which eval-
uates whether a contract exists under which the criminal will be paid for a
story that includes reenactment or discussion of the crime. '' Thus, it is not
the content of the story that is being subjected to the regulation, it is the
receipt of profits by the criminal at the expense of his or her victim.
2. The Incidental Effect of Deterrence on Speech is Too Speculative to
Label the Son of Sam Law Content-Based
The second point addresses the majority's contention that the Son of Sam
law places a financial burden on the criminal speaker based on the content of
his speech that it places on no other speaker.' 8 2 As has been illustrated
above, since the statute aims to regulate the criminal's profits and not the
content of his speech, the law places only an incidental burden on the crimi-
178. The Son of Sam law applied only to a representative or agent of the criminal-turned-
author if that person stood in a legal relationship to the criminal by acting as a "straw man"
through which funds from the literary work would flow to the criminal. N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 632-a(l) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991); see also John T. Loss, Note, Criminals Selling
Their Stories: The First Amendment Requires Legislative Reexamination, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
1331, 1334-36 (1987).
179. The statute only referenced the proceeds of a literary work written by a criminal-
turned-author that expressed his opinions, beliefs, thoughts and feelings about a particular
crime. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l). If no proceeds flow from the work to the criminal,
the Son of Sam law is not applicable. Id.
180. Id. at § 632-a.
181. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp.
170, 177-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
182. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501,
508 (1991).
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nal's speech if he or she chooses not to speak."' 3 The First Amendment
protects the speaker's message and his ability to convey that message to the
public, not his ability to maximize his own profits.184 Thus, the Son of Sam
law survives the Court's concerns about preventing infringement of the crim-
inal's right to speak, rather than protecting his right to profit from that
speech.
B. Public Policy Provides Additional Support for the Use of a Lower
Standard of Review
Reviewing the Arcara 185 and Branzburg 18 6 decisions, as well as the com-
mercial speech and fighting words doctrines,"" it appears that the Court has
historically considered the public policy reasons behind a regulation affect-
ing speech and has adjusted its standard of review accordingly. Like Simon
& Schuster, these cases concerned statutes that infringed on protected
speech, yet which nonetheless were found to be compatible with the First
Amendment. The Son of Sam law, a vital component in an overall victim
compensation scheme, should be given similar consideration.
183. "[E]very civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceivable burden on First
Amendment protected activities. One liable for a civil damages award has less money to spend
... [on protected activities], yet no one would suggest that such liability gives rise to a valid
First Amendment claim." Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986).
The Son of Sam law does not directly or substantially burden free speech since it does not
prevent a willing criminal from speaking. Only a criminal who refuses to speak if he does not
profit from that speech is effectively deterred by the Son of Sam law. There are many reasons,
besides money, which motivate criminals to speak. For example, Charles Manson spent "hun-
dreds of hours" telling his life story, and "although it is his story, Charles Manson receives no
royalties or other renumeration from [the] book. His only recompense will be the chance to
have his story heard." NUEL EMMONS, MANSON IN His OWN WORDS 17 (1986). Mark
David Chapman, whose story entitled "The Man Who Shot John Lennon" appeared in PEO-
PLE MAGAZINE, "agreed that he did not wish to profit from his crime story." Respondents'
Brief, supra note 29, at n.34.
184. In several decisions, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not pro-
vide special protections to people who are discouraged from exercising their constitutional
right by the government's withdrawal of a financial incentive which is not aimed at sup-
pressing speech. See, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 628 (1989) (rec-
ognizing that a denial of an exception to a forfeiture statute for a criminal defendant's right to
counsel of his choice under the Sixth Amendment would also preclude the criminal from as-
serting a First Amendment challenge); Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 369 (1988)
(rejecting a challenge under the First Amendment that denial of food stamp benefits to families
where a member is on strike reduces the amount of money people had to spend which in turn
could reduce their incentive to speak under the First Amendment). These decisions illustrate
that a law which affects a speaker's financial incentive to speak but does not prevent him from
communicating his thoughts and ideas, does not directly or substantially burden speech.
185. 478 U.S. 697 (1986); see also supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
186. 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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A commonly held belief is that no person should be permitted to profit
from his or her own wrongdoing."' 8 It is not only wrong for a criminal to
commit a crime and profit from it, but also wrong for offenders to add insult
to injury by profiting from the victimization without recompense to their
victim."9 In order to remedy this situation, Congress and state legislators
have enacted restitution' 90 statutes. 191 Restitution serves many purposes,
such as providing redress for victims, rehabilitating offenders, reducing the
need for vengeance by the victim, allowing less severe and more humane
sanctions for offenders, and reducing demand upon the criminal justice
system.1
92
Critics of the Son of Sam law contend that the existing restitutionary legis-
lation in New York is sufficient to compensate victims of criminals who seek
to profit from their crimes.'93 While an appropriate start, such restitution
programs are often an ineffective aid to crime victims.' 94 A major problem
with the restitutionary laws is that convicted criminals usually do not have
188. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 41 (1921)
(stating that the principle that "no man should profit from his own inequity or take advantage
of his own wrong" has "its roots deeply fastened in universal sentiments of justice.").
189. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 1991), vacated,
112 S. Ct. 859 (1992).
190. Alan T. Harland, Compensating the Victims of Crime, 14 CRIM. L.B. 203, 204-05
(1978) (explaining that victim compensation refers to state-funded programs whereas restitu-
tion indicates money or services provided by offenders as directed by the criminal justice
system).
191. In 1982, Congress enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) which
provided that convicted offenders pay restitution to their victims. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580
(1988); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3681 (West Supp. 1991) (stating that federal collateral profits of
crimes restitution order applies only to convicted persons).
Restitution under section 60.27 of the New York Penal Law, a component of the criminal
sentencing scheme, applies only to convicted criminals. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27 (McKinney
1987).
192. See Burt Galaway, Toward the Rational Development of Restitution, in RESTITUTION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF SANCTIONS 77, 82-83 (Joe Hudson &
Burt Galaway, eds., 1977).
193. See Barbara F. Wand, Note, Criminals-Turned-Authors: Victims' Rights v. Freedom of
Speech, 54 IND. L.J. 443, 444 (1979) (stating that the Son of Sam law's purpose is to secure
compensation for victims of violent crimes and that CVCA achieves this goal in and of itself).
194. Explaining the VWPA, former Congressman Peter W. Rodino, Jr. of New Jersey
warned against " 'false hopes ... that restitution is a panacea for the financial ills of crime
victims.'" Id.; Thomas M. Kelly, Note, Where Offenders Pay for Their Crimes: Victim Resti-
tution and Its Constitutionality, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 685, 694 n.67 (1983) (quoting 128
CONG. REC. H 8202 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982)). Rodino emphasized that restitution will only
apply when the criminal "is caught, convicted and 'possesses the resources to make it.' Resti-
tution 'cannot reasonably be expected to benefit the majority of crime victims.' "; see also
DEBORAH M. CARROW, CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION 10 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1980) (as-
serting that the fact that a restitution statute can only be enforced when offenders are captured
and convicted is its most limiting barrier).
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sufficient assets to compensate their victims due to asset dissipation prior to
judgment or indigence. 95
New York's general attachment provision provides an example of how the
pervasive nature of these problems has thwarted victim restitution laws.
196
New York's attachment remedy neither notifies a victim of the existence and
location of attachable property, nor ensures that such property will be se-
cured until the victim seeks an order of attachment.' 9 7 Further, New York's
195. Under the current system, a criminal has the opportunity to dissipate profits between
the time he receives them and before a restitution order is entered. The Son of Sam law, in
contrast, removes this avoidance technique by securing funds in a state run escrow account.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l) (McKinney 1982).
Similarly, although restitution orders may be imposed on a convicted indigent defendant,
they will be extremely difficult to enforce because courts and probation departments do not
have the time nor the resources to serve as collection agencies for victims. Lorraine Slavin &
David J. Sorin, Project, Congress Opens a Pandora's Box-The Restitution Provisions of the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 507, 572 (1984) (expres-
sing the difficulty for courts and probation departments to effectively perform their functions
in addition to serving as debt collectors).
196. Article 62 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules is an attempt to provide a
victim the means of satisfying a judgment by attaching the criminal's property. N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. 6201 (1)(2)(3) (McKinney 1990). However, in order for the victim to get an
order of attachment, the court must conclude that the victim is likely to succeed on the merits
and that the criminal is a nondomiciliary, a resident who cannot be served or someone who has
attempted to assign or dispose of property with the intent to frustrate the judgment. Id.; see
also N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620-635 (McKinney 1982). New York's Crime Victims Compensa-
tion Act, enacted 11 years prior to the Son of Sam law, allows a victim to apply to the Board
for compensation from funds provided by the state, rather than from the criminal. This con-
tention fails in two ways. First, the Son of Sam law is applicable only to those cases in which a
criminal would be unjustifiably enriched from the proceeds of crime committed against a par-
ticular victim. New York has repeatedly stated its substantial interest as ensuring that
criminals do not profit from the proceeds of crime before their victims have an opportunity to
be compensated from those proceeds. Simon & Schuster Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 510 (1991); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fishchetti, 916 F.2d 777 &
783 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991). The Son of Sam statute does not purport to
compensate all victims for their injuries. Secondly, a victim is limited under CVCA to a maxi-
mum recovery of $20,000, an amount which may be less than a victim's recoverable injuries.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(3). Thus, it is possible that a victim would need to look to the escrow
account established under the Son of Sam law, in addition to CVCA, to be fully compensated.
197. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 6201; cf N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l). Under the Son of
Sam law, a criminal's profits from a contract for his story can be secured by the state before a
victim even learns of the contract, thereby preventing the dissipation of funds. See also N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 632-a(9) (providing that any actions taken by an offender to avoid application
of the statute, although not specifically anticipated by it, are null and void as against the public
policy of the state).
The Hill situation is a clear example of the inadequacy of New York's attachment statute
with reference to profits made by a criminal's storytelling. By the time WISEGUY, supra note
30, was published in 1985, Henry Hill had already received, and may have dissipated, approxi-
mately $100,000 from Simon & Schuster. Respondent's Brief, supra note 29, at n.41. One of
Hill's victims, Patricia Eisenberg, who learned of Hill's involvement in her husband's murder
as a result of the book, had no knowledge of the existence of attachable property until a consid-
erable time after Hill received the money. Id. Without the Son of Sam law, Ms. Eisenberg
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attachment statute does not provide the statute of limitations and priority
features contained in the Son of Sam law.1
98
The Son of Sam law attempts to remedy these problems by preventing
dissipation of funds by maintaining a secured escrow account, by notifying
victims of the availability of funds, by expanding the statute of limitations to
five years, and by prioritizing the distribution of funds with preference to the
victim. 19 9 The Son of Sam law aids criminals and encourages them to tell
their stories.2 ° ° For example, the criminal is granted first priority to use
escrow funds to pay his legal fees.2° ' The Son of Sam law also establishes a
mechanism for a criminal to provide restitution to the victims of his crime if
he so desires.20 2
C. Son of Sam Law Withstands Constitutional Examination
Under the O'Brien Test
Rather than being viewed as a content-based regulation, the Son of Sam
law should be seen as a statute that regulates conduct containing both speech
and nonspeech elements. 2 3 The Court has acknowledged that regulations
are constitutional if they serve to regulate some type of behavior and by
would probably never have learned of the existence of Henry Hill's profits and as a result
would have remained uncompensated for her husband's death.
198. The Son of Sam law gives a crime victim five years in which to bring suit against his or
her assailant. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l); cf N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 214-15.
Section 215 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules states "[tihe following actions shall
be commenced within one year: ... an action to recover damages for assault, battery, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, false words causing special damages, or a
violation of the right to privacy under section fifty-one of the civil rights law." N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. § 215. "The following actions must be commenced within three years:... an
action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute except as
provided in sections 213 and 215; ... an action to recover damages for a personal injury except
as provided in Section[ ] . . . 215." Id. § 214.
The Son of Sam law prioritizes the distribution of escrow funds as follows: Payments or-
dered by the Board, subrogation claims of the state, civil judgments of crime victims, other
judgment creditors, and the crimimal himself. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l 1); cf N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. § 5234. Where two or more orders of attachment are issued against the same
judgment debtor, they shall be satisfied out of the proceeds of personal property in the order in
which they were issued.
199. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a.
200. Id.
201. Id. § 632-a(8). The statute allows the criminal to receive a portion of the escrowed
money to pay legal fees, thereby permitting him, if he has insufficient assets, to afford private
counsel.
202. Id. § 632-a(1 1), (c), (d). Under the Son of Sam law, victim's judgments take priority
over unsatisfied judgments of other creditors.
203. See supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text. The Son of Sam law regulates con-
duct in that it monitors the financial transactions entered into by a criminal from which he
stands to profit.
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doing so incidentally affect free speech.2 °" The Son of Sam law in no way
regulates the criminal's means of communication-he is free to tell his story
to whomever, whenever and through whatever medium he chooses. The in-
cidental limitation on First Amendment freedoms may be justified by New
York's important governmental interest of compensating victims from the
proceeds of the crime.20 5
The Son of Sam law withstands the O'Brien four-part test. First, it is
within New York's constitutional power to compensate its citizens who have
fallen victim to crime.20 6 Second, the Supreme Court established that New
York has a substantial and compelling governmental interest in ensuring
that criminals do not profit from discussing or reenacting their crimes before
their victims have an opportunity to be compensated from those profits.20 7
Third, compensating victims from the proceeds of crime and making sure
that criminals do not profit at the expense of their victims is indeed unre-
204. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). The law incidentally effects the
criminal's speech in that he or she may choose not to speak if he or she is prevented from
profiting from that speech. However, the possible deterrent effect on criminal-turned-authors
is speculative at best. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. "Accomplished writers
spending a year or two or three on a single book, like Peter Maas or Gay Talese, have proven
to the world that you don't have to pay these [criminals]-they'll tell you anyway, if you're a
hardworking, honest journalist." Robert M. Snider, Coming Soon to a Theatre Near You, 7
CAL. LAWYER 28, 31-32 (Apr. 1987) (quoting John H. Stein, deputy director of the National
Organization for Victim Assistance in Washington, D.C.).
205. See TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-2, at 789-90 and accompanying text (discussing the
compelling interest standard of review). The Supreme Court has held "where 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (quoting United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)). The possibility of a criminal being deterred from
telling his or her story may be justified by New York's compelling interest in compensating
victims of crime from the proceeds of such crime.
206. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. It is undisputed that New York has the
constitutional authority to enact a law which enables victims to obtain compensation from the
assets of criminals. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991).
There can be little doubt ... that the State has a compelling interest in ensuring that
victims of crime are compensated by those who harm them. Every State has a body
of tort law serving exactly this interest. The State's interest in preventing wrongdo-
ers from dissipating their assets before victims can recover explains the existence of
the State's statutory provisions for prejudgement remedies and orders of restitution.
Id.
207. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509-10. The Son of Sam law preserves "a victim's
equitable right to be compensated from moneys earned by a criminal as a result of the victimi-
zation." Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 570 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 1991), vacated,
112 S. Ct. 859 (1992). "[T]he victims who have been injured by the criminal act, and the State,




lated to the suppression of free expression.20 8 The fact that postponement of
financial renumeration could possibly deter a few criminals-turned-authors
from telling their stories is an incidental result of the primary purpose of the
regulation. Finally, the substantial governmental interest supporting the
Son of Sam law "would be achieved less effectively absent the [statute].,"209
The tailoring standard required under O'Brien is not a least-restrictive anal-
ysis test.210 Instead, the statute may not be substantially broader than neces-
sary to achieve the compelling interest.21 ' There appears to be no plausible
way that the statute can provide for differentiation between works contain-
ing a vast amount of crime recollection and those with only a minimal
amount of recollection. In doing so, the statute would give the Board power
to apply the law at its discretion using a subjective and arbitrary measure-
ment.212 Accordingly, the Son of Sam law is arguably not substantially
broader than necessary to effectively compensate victims from the proceeds
of crime.2 13
208. The Second Circuit correctly determined that "[tihe purpose of the statute.., is not
to suppress speech but to assure that funds are set aside out of profits." Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 783 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991); see also supra
notes 200-02 and accompanying text (discussing incentives inherent in the Son of Sam law that
encourage a criminal's speech).
209. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (applying the O'Brien test).
210. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989). "So long as the means
chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest,...
the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's
interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." Id.
211. The district court concluded that any restriction on speech is no greater than is essen-
tial to promote the government's interest in compensating crime victims because "[tihe law is
drawn not to prohibit expressive activity, but to garnish the proceeds so that they will be used
in a productive manner. The statute reaches only proceeds from expressive activity for the
purpose of preventing a criminal from directly profiting from his or her crime." Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170, 179 (S.D.N.Y.
1989), aff'd, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
An argument can be made that the Son of Sam law should be re-written to cover only the
profits of convicted criminals because "admitted criminals" may not be considered criminals
in the eyes of the law. This would eliminate the overinclusiveness claim from the "convicted
persons" provision.
212. Any differential device would constitute content-based discrimination and would be
absolutely contrary to the dictate of the First Amendment. For example, a work containing 50
percent recollected material is subject to the law, but a work with only 49 percent recollected
material is not. Also, there is no practical way to measure the quantity of recollection mate-
rial--counting the number of words used to discuss the crime compared to the total number of
words of the literary work would be administratively impossible and would open the door to
deceit and political pressure to allow certain works to bypass the statute and other works to be
covered.
213. By limiting the reach of the statute and then only attaching the profits for the benefit
of the particular victims of that crime, the statute achieves New York's compelling interest in a
manner that is most effective and does not unduly burden free speech. The priorities for pay-
ing money out of the escrow account are also essential to achieving the state's objective since
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V. CONCLUSION
The Son of Sam law, like the forty-two other existing criminal antiprofit
statutes, was designed to provide relief for victims of crime. By requiring a
criminal to postpone collection of the proceeds from literary works that re-
count his crime, victims stand a better chance of recovering some kind of
compensation from the person who violated their peace of mind. In Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York Crime Victims Board, the
Court disallowed even this kind of nominal relief.
By applying a strict scrutiny standard of review to the Son of Sam law, the
Court has, in effect, condemned this form of restitution to victims nation-
wide. A better view, which has been adopted by the Court in several analo-
gous situations, is to apply a lower standard of review. The Son of Sam law
should be viewed as a combined speech and nonspeech regulation. The law's
incidental effect on a criminal's speech can certainly be justified by the na-
tionwide policy of compensating innocent crime victims before wrongdoers
profit from their crimes. The public policy issues underlying the Son of Sam
law further substantiate the use of a less exacting standard of review.
Lisa Ann Morelli
the victim is given priorty over the criminal and other judgment creditors. N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 632-a(8) (McKinney 1982); see also supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing
the Son of Sam law as a necessary addition to New York's overall victim compensation
scheme).
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